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t
This Article draws on general takings scholarship to evaluate the
telecommunications law and scholarship to date on takings challenges to the
local-exchange provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Recent
cases and scholarship have proposed many different rules of decision for these
takings challenges: "'per se" categorical pro-compensation rules, confiscatory-
ratemaking formulas, and "ad hoc" interest-balancing formulas. The
authorities that have advanced each of these proposals are to a large degree
informed by contestable assumptions about the nature of property and its
constitutional protection. Takings law and scholarship both reflect deep
disagreements between two overarching understandings of property-a
Libertarian worldview and a Legal Realist worldview. These general
understandings help make sense of and give context to many of the specific
legal arguments advanced in the context of the takings challenges to the 1996
Act. But to the extent that telecommunications lawyers and scholars are
relying on one or the other of these general understandings, their arguments
are no more persuasive than their general understandings are valid. Although
this Article cannot resolve the disputes about the 1996 Act definitively, the
Article does help identify the questions central to the takings analysis, by
showing how sound takings doctrine integrates the narrow concerns of
telecommunications policy with the broader concerns of constitutional
property theory.
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Introduction
This Article examines the use and abuse of takings property theory in the
specialized telecommunications law and scholarship about local-exchange
takings claims. Congress significantly transformed the structure of federal
telecommunications regulation in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the
Act," or "the 1996 Act").' In the same year, the Federal Communications
Commission promulgated regulations to execute the provisions of the Act that
restructured the market for local phone service throughout the United States.
These statutes and regulations require the Baby Bells and other local-exchange
carriers ("the incumbents") to interconnect their local exchanges to the facilities
of competing local-service providers ("the competitors"). 2 These duties, in
turn, raise serious claims for just compensation under the Takings Clause,
which guarantees that "private property" may not be "taken for public use
without just compensation. 3 In the 2002 decision Verizon Corp. v. FCC, the
Supreme Court declined to speak broadly to the merits of these takings claims,
instead encouraging the incumbents to litigate such claims state by state in
ongoing proceedings.
Although virtually all the legal authorities contend that these takings
issues are quite simple and admit of only one answer, they still propose three
different answers. Some authorities have claimed that the incumbents'
constitutional claims raise questions within the framework of confiscatory-
ratemaking doctrine, which guarantees regulated utilities the power to recover
their capital and a reasonable rate of return.' Other authorities have suggested
that when the Act requires incumbents to interconnect their competitors to local
exchanges, it inflicts a regulatory burden tantamount to a "classic physical
taking," which per se entitles the incumbents to just compensation worth the
going market value of the physical infrastructure and access rights taken. A few
1 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
2 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
p 5 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 523-24; Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure,
the Market, and the Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1617, 1685 (2004) (reviewing GOSt A. G6MEZ-IBA1&EZ,
REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION (2003)); William J. Baumol
& Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037 (1997).
6 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional
Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 978 (2003); see also J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber,
Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851 (1996).
Vol. 22:205, 2005
The Telecommunications Act of 1996
courts and commentators have suggested that the FCC's rate regulations are
innocuous under strongly deferential "regulatory-takings" principles associated
with the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York. 7 Those three frameworks-confiscatory ratemaking, per se
compensation, and Penn Central interest balancing-exhaust all the important
possibilities in takings law. It is strange that all the authorities seem so certain
that the legal issues are easy to settle and yet remain so widely divided on how
to settle them.
This Article suggests that the various authorities diverge sharply because
they presuppose different and quite contestable views about property, its
regulation, and its proper constitutional protection. The law and scholarship
specific to post- Verizon takings claims is influenced to a striking degree by the
worldviews lawyers and scholars choose to embrace in relation to property and
takings. Of course, overarching theories of property policy and behavior do not
and cannot prescribe outcomes in specific policy disputes by themselves. The
particulars of such disputes matter at least as much as the general worldviews
that policy makers might apply. Even so, a policy maker's worldview can
subtly affect policy analysis in a specialized field like telecommunications. To
oversimplify slightly, the choice of approach can act as a tie-breaker. Different
approaches create different default presumptions to decide issues-in favor of
government action or inaction, or of compensation or no compensation-when
a judge or industry specialist runs out of more specific factual information and
can no longer apply policy expertise to fill the gaps.
To illustrate such dependencies, this Article shows how different
authorities rely on two principled theoretical positions in the law and
scholarship on takings. One is called the "Libertarian" view, for it lays out
principles of regulation and just compensation that govern takings law if
government's overriding goal ought to be to protect and cultivate free initiative
and action through property rights. The other perspective is herein called, for
want of a better term, the "Legal Realist" view. This label is probably
inaccurate in some respects, because many of the key claims of this view have
emerged in takings law and scholarship only in the last quarter century. At the
same time, many of its key claims draw heavily on ideas about property and
7 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For examples of these authorities, see Texas Office of Public Utility
Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 429 (5th Cir. 1999) (suggesting, in dicta relating to a company's takings
challenge to the 1996 Act, that the claim lacked merit under Penn Central's three-part interest
balancing); Paul W. Garnet, Forward-Looking Costing Methodologies and the Supreme Court's
Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 7 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 119, 122 n. 19 (1999) (suggesting that recent
Supreme Court rate-of-return takings cases have applied a test mirroring the standards that apply to
land-use regulatory-taking challenges); and Michael J. Legg, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC-
Telecommunications Access Pricing and Regulator Accountability Through Administrative Law and
Takings Jurisprudence, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 563, 581-84 (2004) (analyzing post-Verizon takings claims
within the parameters of Penn Central's factors).
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regulation that originated during the Legal Realist era.8 This approach captures
many assumptions about takings that follow if the institution of private
property needs to be reconciled to the redistributive and welfarist aims of the
post-New Deal regulatory state. To be sure, the Libertarian and Realist
approaches do not exhaust all the different ways in which takings law may be
understood. Nevertheless, both have respectable pedigrees in takings precedent.
Libertarian ideas heavily influenced takings and substantive due process
property-rights law throughout the nineteenth century, and they predict the
arguments to which courts appeal today on the few occasions when the
Supreme Court concludes that governments have inflicted takings. Realist ideas
developed during the early twentieth century in large part in response to the
Libertarian influences in the law at the time, influences which impeded the
growth of the modem regulatory state.9 Tensions between these two views
inform many contemporary debates about takings in contemporary
scholarship.'o
If Libertarian principles govern the key questions about the 1996 Act, the
law takes a per se approach to the takings issues and a ratemaking approach to
just compensation. The 1996 Act preempts incumbents' exclusie-fianchise
agreements under state and local law and requires the incumbents to
interconnect competitors to their local exchanges. Under the Libertarian
approach, those legal changes inflict per se takings because they extinguish
different aspects of the incumbents' rights to exclude. Ratemaking principles
then shape the incumbents' just compensation. The compensation comes
primarily from the discounted present value of the rates that the incumbents
would have recovered in state ratemaking proceedings if the 1996 Act had not
terminated those proceedings. These specific rules about takings and just
compensation err on the side of encouraging long-term investment in local
exchanges and else where. In telecommunications, as in other utilities, there
always exists a strong danger that regulators may discourage long-term utility
investment by using the power to regulate to expropriate capital. If takings law
provides a per se guarantee that incumbents will recover as just compensation
any stranded costs that they cannot recover in ratemaking, it encourages long-
term investment in telecommunications and other regulated industries.
On the other hand, if Realist principles govern the relevant questions, it is
also easy to generate an account quite deferential to Congress and the FCC. On
8 I have demonstrated how contemporary takings doctrine depends on Legal Realist theory
in Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 187, 191-
93, 216-19 (2004).
9 See id. at 191-99.
10 Compare id. (advocating an approach to regulatory-takings law consistent with
Libertarian principles), with Stewart E. Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of the
Takings Clause: A Reply to Professor Claeys, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 231 (2004). Compare Frank
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1628 (1988) (describing Libertarian takings
decisions in terms of their "obtuseness"), with Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the
Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1988).
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this account, the 1996 Act treats incumbents as innocuously as rent-control
regulations treat landlords. It leaves the incumbents with a wide zone of
freedom to profit in the telecommunications sector, and it provides them with
new and valuable benefits, including rights to charge competitors for access to
their local exchanges and the long-sought right to compete in long-distance
markets. The overarching deferential framework expresses a strong preference for
different policy goals: takings law need not compensate incumbents as
extensively as the Libertarian view insists in order to guarantee efficient long-
term investment in utility infrastructure. If anything, such compensation rules
frustrate more immediate and concrete goals, in this case competition in the
market for local landline phone service.
These connections and results do not refute or disprove any of the current
law and scholarship on the takings issues raised by the 1996 Act. However,
they do suggest that the relevant issues are more complicated than has been
suggested to date, for at least two reasons. One is doctrinal. Although most
commentators treat per se takings, ad hoc Penn Central takings, and
confiscatory ratemaking takings as three separate doctrinal categories, in reality
it is difficult to distinguish each category from the others. These categories are
useful at a broad level, but it is hard to reconcile them or prevent them from
overlapping. In large part, the tensions exist because different cases and lines of
doctrine embrace either the Libertarian or Realist approaches. As a result, it is
perilous to apply the various doctrines as fixed black-letter law. Even diehard
doctrinalists must account for the influence of Libertarian and Realist ideas.
The second complicating factor is that telecommunications scholarship
and takings scholarship seem to have different objectives. From my limited
experience with the literature, telecommunications scholarship seems to be a
field guided by what James Landis called "expertness," a standard for
policymaking and scholarship according to which "the art of regulating an
industry requires knowledge of the details of its operation."'" The scholarship
to date about the 1996 Act, for instance, tends to focus on the policy questions
most directly connected to the Act's local-interconnection provisions. Because
this scholarship focuses on immediate policy questions, it tends to treat takings
doctrine as one of several available instruments to use to solve the most specific
and urgent problems in the telecommunications industry. By its focus and
interests, then, scholarship about the 1996 Act tends to postpone or defer other
questions that preoccupy takings scholarship-more abstract and
comprehensive political-theory questions about property, regulation, and
constitutionalism. Because these two bodies of scholarship focus on different
11 David Dana and Thomas Merrill restate the conventional doctrinal wisdom and highlight
many of its ambiguities in DAvID A- DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 86-168
(2002). As they cogently explain, the worst problems arise when determining how to reconcile
confiscatory-ratemaking doctrine with the other two categories. See id at 164-68.
12 JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938).
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questions, they also seem to pay different degrees of respect to different kinds of
knowledge. While the relevant telecommunications scholarship seems to stress
specialized knowledge about the telecommunications industry or the
overarching economic problems in that industry, takings scholarship often deals
with comprehensive behavioral or normative claims. The takings claims
associated with the 1996 Act raise several questions so far-reaching. Perhaps
generous just compensation will broadly encourage investment and innovation,
in telecommunications and elsewhere, by sending a strong message that capital
is secure in regulated industries; perhaps such compensation will instead send a
message that regulated industries can make it expensive and therefore
impossible for Congress to reform industries to encourage competition or other
pressing goals. Many of the relevant telecommunications articles to date tend to
downplay these broader considerations-perhaps because, by the standards of
telecommunications scholarship, these considerations are hard to quantify and
take a long time to surface. In doing so, however, such articles make a tradeoff:
by looking only where the light is, they risk missing something important
lurking in the dark.
As a result, this Article helps readers who follow telecommunications law
or takings law evaluate this debate more critically than the case law and
scholarship thus far on the 1996 Act. Many of the most relevant cases and
scholarly authorities assume that the leading takings cases prescribe more
certain results than those cases really do. Perhaps these cases and authorities
underestimate the conflicts in the doctrine; if not, they are probably assuming
that the doctrine advances firm normative positions when in reality the doctrine
reflects deep normative disagreements stemming from the political questions
raised in scholarship on takings. And if such claims are hotly contested in the
takings literature, by all rights those claims should be subject to even more
rigorous examination according to the technical and expertise-driven
expectations of telecommunications scholarship. Even if this Article does not
settle the most important policy questions, then, it does highlight important
limitations in the scholarship to date and it clarifies the overarching issues.
I. The Local-Exchange Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
The takings lawsuits in question arose out of a quid pro quo effectuated by
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Incumbent local-exchange carriers
received permission to provide long-distance service in competition with
AT&T, MCI, and other long-distance services, on condition that they
relinquished the dominant positions they enjoyed in local markets as
franchisees. On the long-distance side, previous law had barred incumbents
created from the AT&T break-up from providing long-distance service.' 3 The
13 See, e.g., CHARLES H. KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
54-60 (ist ed. 1994).
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1996 Act opened up long-distance markets to those incumbents, provided that
they demonstrated to the FCC's satisfaction that they met a fourteen-point
statutory checklist. 4
The 1996 Act opened up local markets along similar lines. Before 1996,
local telephone service was largely a regulated monopoly. 5 While one must be
careful not to over-generalize about how regulators in diffLrent states and
localities regulated local phone service, all regulated by some combination of
contractual franchise and public-utility regulation, with more of the former
earlier and more of the latter later. 6 (In this regard, changes in phone regulation
broadly tracked changes in franchise regulation generally. 17) Usually, state or
local utility regulators gave franchises to local-exchange carriers-to AT&T
before its break-up in 1983 and to the Bell Operating Companies and other
incumbent local-exchange carriers thereafter. Consistent with traditional
principles of utility regulation, state utilities regulated the incumbents' rates to
customers for intrastate service.'" It also gave the incumbents exclusive
franchise monopolies within their territories.19 Before 1996, AT&T and the
incumbents owed a few targeted duties to interconnect outsiders to their local
exchanges. The primary duties were to carry interexchange carriers (long-
distance companies that needed to connect to local exchanges to reach their
customers) and competitive access providers (which connect end users to
interexchange carriers through dedicated lines off of the local exchanges)."
However, in other respects, the incumbents' franchise monopolies were largely
exclusive. In particular, for the better part of the twentieth century it was widely
agreed that the incumbents owed no duty to carry signals for potential
competitors in the local phone-service market.2' Policymakers justified the
exceptions on the ground that it was impossible to foster competition for local
phone service. The wires that connect phones to phone lines, they believed,
established a "bottleneck" through which all competitors would need to pass to
reach local customers. 22 The exceptions for interexchange carriers and others
14 47 U.S.C. § 271(c), (d)(3).
15 See, e.g., PETER HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 2.1.2 (2d ed.
1999).
16 See. e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 5-17.
17 See George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation"
Debate, 36 J.L. & ECoN. 289 (1993).
18 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
19 See. e.g., Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872, 875
(2004).
20 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 32-39.
21 See STUART M. BENJAMIN El AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW & POLICY 115 (2001)
("[A] central premise of the Bell divestiture was that the provision of local telephone service was a
monopoly enterprise. This view had taken hold back in the 1920s and had led to the system of state-
sanctioned local monopolies that both pre-dated and survived the Bell breakup."); HLBER ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 2.1.2, at 86 (claiming that "[t]he 1996 Act reversed the presumption" that local phone
service was a legal monopoly).
22 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 31-32.
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only reinforced the basic presumption that local exchanges were natural
monopolies and best regulated as such.23 Within such expectations, as Peter
Huber, Michael Kellogg, and John Thorne explain, "[e]qual access obligations
within the monopoly would have been useless or worse. ' 4
This monopoly approach began to lose favor in the 1970s, in
telecommunications and in other public-utility fields. Joseph Keamey and
Thomas Merrill have thoroughly documented these changes in their article The
25Great Transformation in Regulated Industries Law. Regulators began to
promote a new paradigm, which sought to "subject to ordinary contractual
relations all common carrier and 2public utility services that can be provided by
multiple competing providers. For those sectors of an industry that could
not be organized around ordinary principles of contract and competition, the
new paradigm established "a new set of regulatory obligations-including the
duty to interconnect, to lease unbundled network elements, and to sell services
for resale. ' 2 7 As Merrill and Kearney aptly explain, in the new paradigm "the
owners of such bottleneck facilities ... [became] the focal point of regulatory
attention. In effect, the owners of natural monopoly facilities assume[d] new
common carrier duties toward their competitors, and these duties [were]
regarded as more important than those they owe[d] to their traditional
customers. '28 This transformation eventually reached telecommunications law.
As Peter Huber, Michael Kellogg, and John Thome explain, in
telecommunications, "both state and federal regulators had been moving
steadily in th[e] direction" of this paradigm shift starting in the 1980s.29 In the
early 1990s, the FCC launched regulatory initiatives to encourage incumbents
30to interconnect phone-service providers to their exchanges. In the years
leading up to 1996, many states established either a regime of full competition
for the provision of switched local exchange service, or a statutory mandate to
open their local exchanges to competition in the near future.3'
The 1996 Act completed this change. It abandoned the natural-monopoly
conception of local phone service for the competition-antitrust conception that
had developed in other similar industries. As one supporter of the 1996 Act
23 See, e.g., Verizon Communications v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 475 (2002). The FCC proposed
new rules in the late 1980s and early 1990s to create targeted duties to interconnect, see PETER W.
HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 2.4 (Cum. Supp. 2004); HUBER ET AL., supra
note 15, § 5.4, but the rulemakings only reinforced the impression that the duty broke new ground from
the paradigm that prevailed at the time. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
24 See HUBER ET AL., supra note 23, § 2.4 (Cum. Supp. 2004); see also United States v.
AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1331, 1352 n.65 (D.D.C. 1981).
25 Kearney & Thomas, supra note 18, at 1323.
26 Id. at 1363.
27 Id. at 1364.
28 Id. at 1364.
29 HU3ER ET. AL., supra note 23, § 2.4, at 70 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
30 See id. § 2.4, at 70-71.
31 See id. § 2.4, at 74.
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explained, the Act broke new ground because it told incumbents "to let the
competitors come in and try to beat your economic brains out."32 First, the Act
extinguished the incumbents' franchise monopolies by preempting all state and
local laws that "prohibit[ed] the ability of entity to provide any interstate or
intrastate telecommunications service. With the franchises out of the way,
sections 251 and 252 of the Act proceeded to impose "must-carry"
requirements on the incumbents. Section 251(a) imposes on each incumbent a
general duty to interconnect its local exchange to the facilities and equipment of
other carriers.34 To discharge this general duty, section 251(c) lays out several
specific duties. The first is physical "collocation": under section 251(c)(6),
incumbents must provide to competitors the office space and other physical
plant necessary for them to interconnect to the local exchange or to unbundled
network elements.35  Sections 251(c)(2) and (3) require incumbents to
interconnect to competitors' local networks and to competitor unbundled
36
network elements, respectively.
The 1996 Act anticipated that the incumbent local-exchange carriers
would get compensated for assuming these interconnection duties. Sections
251(c)(2), (3), and (6) specify that incumbents are entitled to charge rates that
"are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory." With regard to interconnection
and unbundled network elements (covered by sections 251(c)(2) and (3)),
section 252(d) goes on to provide that rates that "may include a reasonable
profit" and "shall be based on the cost ... of providing the interconnection or
network element."37 Section 252(d) also specifies, however, that whatever this
term "cost" means, it must be "determined without reference to a rate-of-return
or other rate-based proceeding. 38
These provisions gave the FCC considerable leeway to identify the proper
measure of "cost," rate formulas that would be "just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory." That choice raised sensitive policy questions. On one
hand, the FCC could have spread historical costs-the costs the incumbents
had expended building or maintaining their exchanges in the past-by
including historical costs as an element of the "cost" competitors were required
to pay incumbents for forced access.3 9 Distributional concerns could have
32 141 CONG. REc. 15,572 (1995) (statement of Sen. Breaux), quoted in Verizon, 535 U.S. at
488.
33 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (emphasis added).
34 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a).
35 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6). Incumbents can avoid providing physical space if they can
provide an adequate substitute with virtual collocation and show that physical collocation is not
practical for technical or space reasons. See id
36 See 47 US.C. § 251(c)(2)-(3).
37 See 47 US.C. § 252(d)(1).
38 See id
39 Dissenting in Verizon, Justice Breyer thought the text, structure, and purpose of the 1996
Act required this interpretation of cost. See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 548-49 (citing ALFRED KAHN, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 330 (1988))-
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justified such an approach, because the incumbents could have argued that the
competitors ought to share in the costs used to create and maintain the
exchanges they are using to their benefit.40 Perhaps dynamic-efficiency concerns
could have justified this approach as well. Such concerns entitle incumbents to
compensation, from some source, for stranded investments, to promote efficient
research and development for local-exchange infrastructure over the long haul.4 1
On the other hand, the FCC could also have insisted on leaving stranded costs
where they fell. If the FCC had billed competitors for stranded costs using
interconnection rates, it would have increased interconnection rates above the
marginal cost of providing service through the local exchange. That increase
would then have discouraged the efficient use of, and competition over, network
elements by incumbents and competitors.42
The FCC preferred to promote the latter concerns rather than the former.43
When it promulgated the rate regulations for the intereonnectivity provisions of
section 251, the FCC interpreted "cost," "just," "reasonable," and "non-
discriminatory" to require a formula based on "TELRIC"-"total element long-
run incremental cost" pricing. When an incumbent provides a competitor access
to a network element, the incumbent is entitled to the sum of TELRIC costs
plus a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs. 44 The latter
addend, "forward-looking common costs," consist of "economic costs
efficiently incurred in providing a group of elements or services... that cannot
be attributed directly to individual elements or services. ' 45 The regulations
specify that the former addend, TELRIC costs, "should be measured based on
the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available
and the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location of the
incumbent LEC's wire centers. ' 46 TELRIC rates thus keep rate payments at or
below an incumbents' actual costs. If someone invents a new technology that
makes the local exchange more efficient than anyone in the industry could have
expected, TELRIC frees the competitors from sharing the costs of the
incumbents' less-than-optimal investments. The regulations reinforce this
result when they exclude "embedded costs," defined as "the costs that the
incumbent LEC incurred in the past. 47
This general background brings to light most of the factual and policy
issues relevant to the Takings Clause. The FCC's interconnectivity rates do
40 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY 311 (1998).
41 See Douglas Lichtman & Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications:
Iowa Utilities and Verizon, 2002 SUP. CT. RE.V. 41, 67.
42 See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996); Lichtman & Picker, supra note 41, at 67.
See also EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 313.
43 See F.C.C.R., supra note 43, 679, 738.
44 F.C.C. Common Carier Services, 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a) (2004).
45 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(c).
46 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1).
47 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(d).
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not allow incumbents to spread and share stranded historical costs with
competitors. In principle, it is possible that incumbents suffered a bait and
switch, most likely if, before 1996, state and local ratemaking proceedings were
dominated primarily by the political demands of residential customers. If so,
local phone-service rates were probably low, regulators probably stretched
incumbents' amortization schedules far into the future, and TELRIC rates
therefore cut short a substantial stream of compensation for historical costs. On
the other hand, it is also possible that incumbents were not harmed seriously,
especially if, before 1996, they influenced state and local ratemaking
proceedings more effectively than customers and consumer groups. If so, pre-
1996 ratemakings were probably generous to the incumbents, in which their
post-1996 stranded historical costs are now low or non-existent. This is a
crucial issue of fact to be litigated case by case and state by state. Another issue
of fact is how valuable long-distance service is to the incumbents. On one hand,
perhaps incumbents will recoup a substantial portion of their stranded costs
after they enter and profit in long-distance markets. On the other hand, if long-
distance markets involve close to perfect competition, profits will remain quite
small for the foreseeable future. In the latter scenario, long-distance markets
would be small compensation for the cost of losing exclusive control over local
exchanges. These questions of fact point to crucial questions of policy,
particularly how the 1996 Act's effect on local-exchange investment compares
with its effects in encouraging competition across those exchanges.
II. Tensions Within Takings Law
Nevertheless, a huge conceptual obstacle makes it difficult to analyze these
questions within existing takings law and scholarship: there is no consensus in
either the law or scholarship about how to conceive of "takings" or "private
property." Thomas Merrill and William Baumol have aptly described the case
law. While the Supreme Court has shown "a pronounced tendency to talk
tough about property rights" in some cases, it often "beat[s] a hasty retreat" in
cases that involve "complex regulatory schemes generating pools of winners
and losers.,
48
While this division stems from several factors, one particularly important
factor is the tension between two understandings of property theory. As
explained in the Introduction, one consists of a body of Libertarian thought that
has influenced constitutional property-rights law largely before 1900, and to a
lesser but still noticeable extent more recently. The other, called here the Legal
Realist approach, provides an account of constitutional property rights that
reconciles such rights at a high theoretical level to key features of post-New
48 William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Does the Constitution Require That We Kill the
Competitive Goose? Pricing Local Phone Services to Rivals, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1122, 1129 n.34
(1998).
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Deal redistributive regulation. While the following account runs the risk of
being overly general, it integrates into two comprehensive frameworks many
arguments and tendencies that are familiar to scholars who know takings law.
A. Libertarian Property Theory
Consider first the Libertarian approach. Virtually all writers who embrace
this approach start from the claim that property reflects and encourages inherent
human tendencies to work, produce, and acquire for one's own chosen ends.
Chancellor James Kent, a New York state judge and author of a leading
nineteenth-century legal treatise influenced heavily by natural-rights ideas,
described "the sense of property [as] graciously implanted in the human breast,
for the purpose of rousing us from sloth, and stimulating us to action .. .
Jeremy Bentham made basically the same claim within a utilitarian framework:
"If I despair of enjoying the fruits of my labour, I shall only think of living
from day to day: I shall not undertake labours which will only benefit my
enemies."50 The Libertarian approach accepts that claim as true, at least
politically-if not accurate in every case, accurate enough to rely upon when
establishing government institutions.
Several important descriptive and prescriptive consequences follow.
Descriptively, because self-love and acquisitiveness tie people's interests and
attachments to what they own, the owners of assets generally have better
information than the government or other individuals about how to use their
assets. As Friedrich Hayek claimed,
[t]here would be no difficulty about efficient control or planning were
conditions so simple that a single person or board could effectively survey
all the relevant facts. It is only as the factors which have to be taken into
account become so numerous that it is impossible to gain a view of them that
decentralization becomes imperative.
51
Prescriptively, one of the overriding objects of government becomes the
establishment of laws that recognize, take advantage of, and encourage these
links between human initiative and external assets. As John Locke put it, the
proper object of property regulation is "by established laws of liberty to secure
protection and incouragement to the honest industry of mankind. '2 In one
sense, when the laws promote what Locke called "honest industry," private
property becomes the overriding object of government. But in another sense,
the protection and encouragement of property is simply a different way of saying
that the law should, to the extent that it can, transfer control and use decisions
from legislative majorities and public officials to individual owners. If the
49 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 257 (tst ed. 1827).
50 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
297, 310 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
51 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 49 (1944).
52 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT para. 42 (J.W. Gough ed., 1946).
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institution of property recognizes that different people have different talents,
tastes, and needs, the law ought to presume that individual owners can use
what is closest to them to fit their own needs more effectively than a legislative
majority can with a large class of commercial assets.
These overarching claims lead to several important claims that become
relevant in takings law. First, they create a presumption that "private property"
ought to be conceived of broadly. Because property ordinarily encourages
tendencies that are generally productive, as a starting presumption, owners
should be left with the fullest range of use rights consistent with the rights of
others. Adam Mossoff has described this approach as an "integrated" approach
53to property . Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have called it an "in rem"
conception of ownership 5 4 The Supreme Court reflects the same understanding
when it insists from time to time that "private property" normally covers every
sort of interest the citizen may possess-not only the "vulgar and untechnical
sense of the physical thing," but also "the group of rights inhering in the
citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose
of it."55
One important corollary of this claim is that Libertarian property theory
tends to resist conceiving of property solely in terms of owners' expectations or
future plans. Property protects not any one concrete set of expectations but a
freedom to make choices, Libertarian theory usually presumes that economic
life is characterized by change more than by stasis, that owners' interests differ
more than they resemble one another, and that owners are better-positioned than
neighbors, rivals, or planners to know how best to use their own assets. If these
generalizations describe economic life with tolerable accuracy, it follows that
the law should protect not only owners' current plans but also their rights to
change their minds. The law may take account of owners' expectations, but
expectations play a largely secondary role. Expectations help assess owners'
just compensation when they lose property rights, because strong expectations
suggest that the rights taken are quite valuable to the owner. But Libertarian
property theory seeks to protect initiative in many situations in which an owner
has not yet acquired hard expectations, particularly the fieedoms to change and
adapt.56 This claim follows, as Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith explain, from
a "deep design principle" by which owners are entitled to control "the future
use and enjoyment of particular resources.., that holds against all the
world.""
53 Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REv.
371 (2003).
54 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360 (2001).
55 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
56 Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1549, 1607-15 (2003).
57 Merrill & Smith, supra note 54, at 359, 361.
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Second, Libertarian property theory presumes that, in the absence of some
compelling justification, government ought to preserve security in property by
paying just compensation whenever it restrains the free exercise of property
rights. Courts appreciate this connection when they say, as the Supreme Court
often says in the run-of-the-mill cases, that the Takings Clause's overriding
purpose is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be bome by the public as a
whole." ' 8 If society makes a strong commitment to protecting and encouraging
property rights, the common good seems to be the aggregation of the rights of
all citizens. That relation entitles the government to act for the common good
by taking property for public uses, but at the same time it requires the
government to spread private losses across the entire public. The compensation
may come in-kind, through other consequences of the government action, or
explicitly, through a cash payment. In either case, the owner is entitled to the
fair value of rights extinguished by government actions. By paying that fair
value, Libertarian theory maintains, government encourages security in
property; over the long run, that security encourages many forms of productive
and gainful activity that would not be easy to anticipate ex ante.
In utility law, this basic attitude creates at least some presumption that,
other things being equal, utilities' investments and franchise rights count as
constitutionally protected "private property." This presumption explains an
otherwise strange feature about takings law. If one were to read only the leading
Supreme Court cases and scholarship, it would be reasonable to suspect that
utilities should not be protected by takings principles. The leading authorities
tend to focus on regulatory-takings issues associated with land, and particularly
land use. Zoning, rent-control, environmental, and other similar regulations
generate strong pressures to narrow the scope of regulatory-takings limitations.
In response, the Supreme Court now assumes that "takings" principles were
originally meant to apply only to outright interferences with title ownership
and the right to exclude.5 9 If the law followed this claim to its logical
conclusion, takings protections should apply to utilities only barely, if at all.
In fact, however, utility regulation generates hundreds if not thousands of
60judicial and administrative takings disputes. Courts and commentators may
disagree about the substance of takings principles as they apply to utilities, but
at some minimal level they agree that, in John Drobak's words,
58 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
59 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-22
(2002); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings
Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099 (2000); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for
Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996); William M. Treanor, The Original
Understanding ofthe Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
60 See John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility
Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REV. 65, 65-66 & n.I (1985).
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"constitutional ratemaking doctrine embodies the principles of the takings
clause."
61
Third, the Libertarian approach presumes that it is conceptually possible
and substantively necessary to enforce a relatively fixed conception of the power
to "regulate." Laws that "regulate" may restrain property without triggering
just-compensation requirements. In Libertarian theory, "regulations" are
primarily laws that "make property rights regular"-laws that define the zone of
flee use, control, and transfer rights that are fairly proportional to any asset,
laws that define and enforce abuses of those rights, and laws that facilitate the
orderly use and transfer of property.
6 2
That general understanding of "regulation" narrows the permissible
grounds for "regulating" the property conflicts that arise in telecommunications
law. In telecommunications, the main "regulatory" limit allows government to
restrain operators' rights to exclude and control their rates. Under any
understanding of how to apply general social-compact principles, when an
owner receives a monopoly from the state, he cedes the right to exclude
customers on any basis. When the state grants him control over an asset with
an obvious public use, it imposes on him the responsibility to ensure that the
asset is used consistent with the rights of all. In general, then, the owner
assumes duties not to discriminate among customers and to sell or rent the
monopoly good at rates reasonable in comparison with rates of return for
comparable investments.64 That general proviso still leaves the state free to
choose how to enforce the basic substantive limitation. As explained in the
previous part, traditional common-carrier principles apply this limitation to the
utility in relation to its customers, while contemporary antitrust/bottleneck
principles apply the limitation between the utility and its competitors. In either
case, utilities retain all property rights not necessary to enforce the underlying
understanding of publici juris regulation. When a law restrains the free use of
property more than necessary to enforce this understanding of, it therefore
"takes" the property rights of the utility.
61 Id. at68.
62 See Claeys, supra note 56, at 1553-55; Richard A. Epstein, The "Necessary" History of
Property and Liberty, 6 CHAPMAN L_ REV. 1, 2-3 (2003)-
63 The best illustration of this position, even by a judge jealous of private-property rights,
comes from Justice Field's dissenting opinion in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
64 See id; Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 354 (1883); Railroad
Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S- 362 (1894),
For a historical perspective on Munn and the concept of publici juris, see Harry N. Scheiber, The Road
to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 327, 338-55 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971). There is another
way to understand ratemaking regulation-that it takes investors' capital per se for public uses, and
merely asks whether the investors are getting just compensation for the taking. This view has been
endorsed in EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 274-77; DANA & MERRILL, supra note 11, at 165-66. However,
this view ends up relying or more or less the same substantive principles as the "regulatory takings"
understanding advanced in text,
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Last, Libertarian property theory encourages lawyers to think of property
in "formalist" terms. It encourages them to treat different takings cases as
analogous. This claim follows from Libertarian theory's expansive "integrated"
or "in rem" conception of property rights. If an owner in a case involving land
wins just compensation for losing a particular right in the proverbial bundle,
the decision presumptively counts as precedent for protecting that same right to
dispose in the context of water rights, franchises, or intellectual property. Of
course, that presumption can be reversed, if one can show that the exercise of a
specific right will be harmful to the public or disadvantageous to the rights of
all for one species of property. Separately, the same right may be more or less
valuable for different species of property. But under Libertarian principles, as
long as the basic starting presumption has not been rebutted, it is possible to
compare and contrast rights like use, control, and disposition across a wide
range of species of property. If a given right seems more valuable to one species
than to another, that difference can be considered not when determining whether
a taking has occurred; rather, a taking has occurred, and the difference goes to
determining how much to pay for it in just compensation. What may seem to
be casuistic analogies, then, instead protect a strong general expectation among
owners that, as long as they do not threaten their neighbors, they will retain
control over the use and enjoyment of their property to the exclusion of the rest
of the world.
B. Realist Property Theory
The Realist approach breaks from the Libertarian approach on a wide range
of fronts. Most fundamentally, it questions the account of human nature that
grounds the Libertarian approach. For instance, Margaret Jane Radin has
challenged the Libertarian arguments of Richard Epstein because she questions
Epstein's "Hobbesian model of human nature," within which "[n]othing will
get produced unless people are guaranteed the permanent internalization of the
benefits of their labor.', 5 By calling that claim into question, the Realist
approach expands the realm of the possible for the state. If selfish, industrious,
productive, and acquisitive passions do not limit the realm of the possible for
the state, then the state may achieve a relatively wide range of goals. The
general welfare, as determined by an encompassing majority, becomes the
overriding object of legislative policy. By the same token, property becomes
subordinate to one of many possible goals such a majority might or might not
choose to pursue. As Frank Michelman recognized, once a state has embraced
"the economically active and regulatory state with its licenses, franchises, and
65 Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1683 (1988).
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the like .. the claims of popular sovereignty and classical property cannot, in
truth, be stably reconciled at a very high level of abstraction or generality."
66
The character of property changes to keep pace with the expanding
horizons of possible political action. First, if property is "integrated" within
67
the Libertarian approach, it is "disintegrated" in the Penn Central approach.
Each property right must be justified and defended de novo on its merits.
Owners enjoy "property" only in the rights that are judged to have merit.
Thus, Legal Realist Wallace Hamilton defined "property" in the 1937 edition
of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences as "a euphonious collection of letters
which serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold
in the commonwealth. 6 8 That is also why Penn Central warned that
"'[t]akings' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have
been entirely abrogated., 69 To borrow Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith's
description, the Realist/Penn Central approach applies a "list of uses" approach
to property: "as a list of particularized use rights that individuals have in
resources."
7 0
This "list of uses" understanding of property creates a slight presumption,
which is rebuttable but no less perceptible, against recognizing particular use
rights as property. As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith describe the nerve of
Realist property theory, "property has no fixed core of meaning, but is just a
variable collection of interests established by social convention [that] the state
[may] freely expand or... contract... in the name of the general welfare.'
From this starting perspective it follows that owners ought not to be entitled to
property in specific control, use, or transfer rights unless and until they can
show that such rights contribute to the general welfare. In individual cases,
owners may be able to make this showing. But where the Libertarian approach
presumes that particular rights are useful and part of "property" until
specifically shown to be harmful, the Realist approach presumes that particular
rights are not useful until specifically shown to redound to the general welfare.
Because policymakers make that determination, the Realist list-of-uses
approach also transfers policymaking power from owners to policymakers.
To be sure, within the Realist approach, property still means more than
the right to use one's own property consistent with the state's conception of
what contributes to the general welfare. But to determine whether owners have
special attachments to any stick in the proverbial bag of rights, private property
66 Michelman, supra note 10, at 1627-28.
67 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 22 NOMOS: PROPERTY 69, 72 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
68 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 528 (1937), quoted in Thomas W. Merrill,
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 738 (1998).
69 Penn Cent. Transp. Co- v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
70 Merrill & Smith, supra note 54, at 366.
71 Id. at 365.
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tends to focus on owners' expectations. Frank Michelman contributed to this
view when he argued that, for takings purposes, private property ought to be
conceived of largely in reference to an owner's "investment-backed
expectations. 72 The U.S. Supreme Court embraced Michelman's argument by
making "investment-backed expectations" a crucial element of regulatory-
takings law in Penn Central. This focus, however, subtly builds in a
presumption that owners are not entitled to claim property rights in
development potential, or more generally in the right to put existing property
to new and different uses.
Next, because the Realist approach presumes that many different social
policies may be desirable in different circumstances and for different people, it
tends to doubt that the law can draw clear distinctions between government
actions that "regulate" and "take." This tendency comes out most often in law
and scholarship about the concepts of "harm" and "benefits." In Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, Justice Scalia explained "[tihe transition from [the
Court's] early focus on control of 'noxious' uses to [its] contemporary
understanding of the broad realm within which government may regulate
without compensation was an easy one, since the distinction between 'harm-
preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the
beholder."74 Frank Michelman lent a great deal of respectability to this view in
his 1967 article Property, Utility, and Fairness. Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, which concluded that "there is no
basis for a general rule dispensing with compensation in respect of all
regulations apparently of the 'nuisance-prevention' type .... If one
subscribes to such sentiments, one is skeptical that the law can maintain clear
distinctions between regulations and takings-in nuisance law, in common-
carrier law, or anywhere else.
Finally, where the Libertarian approach presumes that the law can draw
analogies about the same right from one species of property to another, the
Realist approach presumes the opposite. This presumption follows because the
Realist approach prefers to treat questions of property on a right-by-right basis,
and it expects different legislative majorities in different settings to use the
power to regulate to different ends. Thus, Margaret Jane Radin praises the
Realist approach because it is "'ad hoc' . . . essentially particularist,
essentially context-bound and holistic; each decision is an all-things-considered
,,76intuitive weighing. As Frank Michelman explains, "the emergence of the
economically active and regulatory state" creates a strong trend toward the
72 Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation Law, " 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1211-13 (1967).
73 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
74 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1989).
75 Michelman, supra note 72, at 1197.
76 Radin, supra note 65, at 1680.
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"denaturalization and positivization (implying the politicization) of
property."" Under those assumptions, it becomes more difficult to claim that
property protects a regular set of expectations from one species to another. If
anything, as Michelman says, it is "obtuseness" to assume that there is any
such commonality, or to analogize between different species by using the forms
78
of property rights.
1I. The 1996 Act and Tensions Under The Takings Clause
Both of these approaches are well represented in the law and scholarship
on takings. A takings doctrine that seems straightforward on the surface can
vary sharply in application depending on whether the Libertarian or the Realist
understanding seems to fit better with a judge's or policymaker's views on the
facts of a challenged regulation. That tension seems to be informing the debate
over the local-exchange provisions of the 1996 Act.
A. Confiscatory Ratemaking Versus Regulatory Takings
Consider first whether the 1996 Act ought to be viewed as a ratemaking
case or a "regulatory-taking" case. Many telecommunications lawyers agree that
confiscatory-ratemaking principles do and should govern takings challenges to
the local-exchange provisions of the Act and the FCC's regulations. Thomas
Merrill and William Baumol,79 Stuart Buck,80 Michael Legg,81 and Jim Chen82
have all assumed as a matter of course that ratemaking cases should control and
that regulatory-takings principles should not. As Chen puts it, "[t]he Supreme
Court ... has consistently distinguished takings clause restraints on
ratemaking from the takings clause doctrine that governs physical occupations
of real property., 83 In Verizon, the Supreme Court applied to the takings issues
it discussed leading ratemaking precedents including Smyth v. Ames, FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas, and Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch."
There are several reasons to prefer the ratemaking model. One reason is
that regulated industries may be special. As the next section will show, many
strands of regulatory-takings law are strongly deferential to the government and
strongly oriented against paying just compensation to individual claimants.
77 Michelman, supra note 10, at 1627.
78 See id. at 1628.
79 See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 5, at 1042-45.
80 See Stuart Buck, TELRIC vs. Universal Service: A Takings Violation?, 56 FED. COMM. L.J.
1, 38 (2003) ("[T]he confiscatory rate doctrine by definition relates to an unfair rate structure, which
would be precisely the [incumbents'] complaint.").
81 Legg, supra note 7, at 581-84.
82 See Chen, supra note 5, at 1685.
83 Id. at 1686.
84 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 624 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989);
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591 (1944)).
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Perhaps these cases sanction regulations that discourage individual
investments, perhaps not. Such questions raise difficult empirical and policy
questions, as one can see by reviewing the debate over whether rent control
restricts the available supply of apartments. 5 But the telecommunications
industry may present a more compelling case for constitutional protection. In
telecommunications and other regulated industries, investors' up-front
investments may be so substantial that the law must provide investors with
some credible guarantees that the government will not expropriate their sunk
capital. 86 If so, it is better to create in takings law a firewall between regulated
industries and less capital-intensive industries. Whether or not the doctrines
were meant to reflect such a distinction, they are written as if they were. Both
the confiscatory ratemaking and Penn Central doctrines are ad hoc, but the ad
hoc factors point in different directions. As the next section will explain, the
Penn Central factors usually cooperate to discourage compensation.
Ratemaking doctrine, in contrast, favors capital, because the factors focus
primarily on whether the challenged regulation guarantees investors a rate of
return commensurate with the rates for similarly risky investments. 7William
Barr, Henry Weissmann, and John Frantz have advanced such a view of
ratemaking law in their contribution to the scholarship on post-1996 Act
takings claims.8'
Other, more pragmatic arguments for ratemaking, however, fit Realist
background assumptions about takings law. Penn Central claims that all
takings cases are "ad hoc," and it warns lawyers and judges off from using
conceptual severance and other formalistic tools to draw analogies across
different classes of takings cases.89 If one agrees with that sentiment, it makes
comparatively little sense to organize takings analysis around the property
rights taken or around overarching normative questions. By the same token,
however, it makes a great deal of sense to organize law around the economics
and industry where the alleged takings occur. Factors that seem ad hoc from the
standpoint of takings law may be salient and regular features of an industry's
business structure. If so, ratemaking principles ought to govern in
85 See, e.g., PETER D. SALINS & GERARD C.S. MILDNER, SCARCITY BY DESIGN: THE LEGACY
OF NEW YORK CITY'S HOUSING POLICIES 120-21 (1992); Dirk W. Early & Edgar 0. Olsen, Rent
Control and Homelessness, 28 REGIONAL SCI. AND URB. ECON. 6, 797 (1998); Richard A. Epstein, Rent
Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741 (1988); Guy McPherson, Note,
It's the End of the World As We Know It (and I Feel Fine): Rent Regulation in New York City and the
Unanswered Questions of Market and Society, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1156 n.246 (2004).
86 Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller have collected several especially thorough studies exploring
how governments might provide credible commitments to capital in telecommunications in
REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMITMENT: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
(Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller eds., 1996).
87 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308.
88 William Barr et al., The Gild That Is Killing the Lily: How Confusion over Regulatory
Takings Doctrine Is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005).
89 See Penn Central, 436 U.S. at 123.
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telecommunications and other regulated industries, while broader regulatory-
takings principles ought to govern in real estate cases and cases that are
otherwise hard to classify.
But these arguments do not seem compelling within a Libertarian
understanding of property. Again, the Libertarian approach pays a great deal of
respect to the forms of private property. Rights are important proxies for zones
of fireedom that allow owners either to engage in productive activity or to hedge
against uncertainty and change. Ratemaking cases focus on whether the state is
"regulating" the dangers of monopoly, specifically by regulating a utility's
prices and relations to its consumers. By contrast, the 1996 Act extinguishes
rights to exclude-the incumbents' franchises, and their rights not to
interconnect competitors.
Now, as Section HI.C will make clear, ratemaking considerations may be
relevant to the incumbents' entitlement to just compensation. As Stuart Buck
recognizes, if takings law concludes that Congress effected a regulatory taking,
"the real question would then become: does the price structure allowed to the
[incumbents] amount to just compensation or not," a question for which the
law "would likely have to consult the confiscatory rate doctrine." 90 Even so,
under general Libertarian background assumptions, at the takings stage,
ratemaking cases raise the wrong question: ratemaking regulations raise
questions about whether regulators are holding incumbents to an unacceptably
low level of return, while exclusivity regulations raise questions about whether
the regulators have extinguished the means by which utilities can recover any
return at all. At least without specific reference to telecommunications
economics, in the abstract it seems more serious for incumbents to lose the
latter rights than the former. If so, the 1996 Act implicates not ratemaking
doctrine but regulatory-takings doctrine.
B. Taking a Common Carrier's Right To Exclude Competitors
Takings law, however, does not decide a case simply by applying
regulatory-takings principles instead of ratemaking principles. "Regulatory-
takings" law is deeply split in its tendencies. Some portions of regulatory-
takings law incline toward the Libertarian approach, others toward the Realist
approach.
To appreciate the tensions, it is worthwhile to dispel a perception that
causes a great deal of confusion in the commentary on takings law. Many
commentators portray the categorical and balancing regulatory-takings cases as
two sharply, almost hermetically-separate, fields of takings law. 91 This portrait,
while accurate and useful in many run-of-the-mill cases, is highly misleading in
some respects, particularly in its tendency to elevate black-letter doctrine over
90 Buck, supra note 80, at 36.
91 See, e.g., id. at 35-38; Legg, supra note 7, at 581-82.
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substance. All of the Supreme Court's recent regulatory-takings cases,
balancing or categorical, respect Penn Central as the "polestar" of regulatory-
takings law.92 As a result, all apply Penn Central's three-part test: they balance
(1) the owner's economic losses and (2) the owner's lost reasonable
investment-backed expectations against (3) the character of the government
action. 93 However, this test has virtually no content on its own; it takes
whatever content it has from the legal and political theory on which the Court
relies to determine which expectations are "reasonable" and which government
actions have a high "character."
To appreciate the shifts, consider how the Supreme Court first announced
the per se rule for physical occupations, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.94 A New York state law authorized cable companies to install
cable lines and directional taps on landlords' buildings to service not only the
tenants but also other buildings in the neighborhood. The Court respected
Penn Central as the leading regulatory-takings case,95 but then used the second
and third Penn Central factors to require per se compensation whenever the
government permanently and physically occupies property.96 The Court placed
huge social value on the control of land. It did so by insisting that owners have
strong expectations that they will be able to control their land: "[t]he power to
exclude ... [is] one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of
property rights." 97 Similarly, the Court then downgraded the third prong, the
character of the government action. Because the Court regarded an invasion of
land as "perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's property
interests,"9  it explained that "when the 'character of the government
action' . . . is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly
have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether
the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic
impact on the owner." 99
On the other hand, Penn Central itself highlights how the factors change if
the regulation under challenge seems to have more social value. In such cases,
the Court plays up the character of the government action by deferring to it
under rational-basis principles.' This deference tacitly presumes that the
property right at issue has little or no social value worth protecting over the
constitutional long term. The Court then uses Penn Central's first and second
92 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 336 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633
(2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
93 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
94 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
95 Id at 426, 432.
96 Id. at 427, 434-37.
97 Id. at435.
98 Id.
99 Id.; see also Claeys, supra note 8, at 193; Claeys, supra note 56, at 1556-58.
100 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 ("reasonably related to the promotion of the general
welfare").
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prongs to narrow the owner's ability to claim the right at issue as
constitutional "private property." The owner's claim is weak unless she can
show that by dint of long effort and investment she has acquired strong
expectations in protecting that right. Likewise, the law discounts the owner's
economic losses using the "denominator" approach: even if the losses are
substantial in dollars-and-cents terms, they still may not be severe if put in the
context of the productive uses and economic gains still left to the owner.10'
Much of the scholarship relevant to the 1996 Act does not sufficiently
appreciate these two sides to Penn Central. Because the case law is deeply
split, the crucial question about the 1996 Act is one that Penn Central's
doctrine does not even address: should common carriers be entitled to exclude
competitors and other outsiders on the same terms as land owners, intellectual-
property owners, and owners of other forms of property? If the answer is "yes,"
takings law can easily turn to a per se compensation rule; if "no," the law can
just as easily tip towards deferential interest balancing.
Consider first the debate between Daniel Spulber and Christopher Yoo on
one hand, and Jim Chen on the other, about per se takings requirements.
Spulber, Yoo, and Chen agree that section 251(c)(6) triggers Loretto's per se
compensation rule when it forces incumbents to collocate and therefore give
competitors physical access to their offices. 10 2 Yoo and Spulber, however,
proceed to argue that the interconnection requirements of sections 251 (c)(2) and
(3) force "virtual collocation[s]" analogous to physical takings, and therefore
also trigger per se compensation. 03  Chen disagrees, arguing that
interconnection requirements do not inflict takings because they do not impose
physical occupations. "4
However, takings doctrine is not as rule-bound as Chen, Spulber, and
Yoo assume. The vagaries become clearer if one turns away from Penn Central
and Loretto to other, less-known takings cases formally analogous to the Act's
local-exchange provisions and regulations. To begin with, consider section
251 's interconnection provisions, which resemble easements and rights of way.
Kaiser Aetna v. United States is particularly instructive here.'05 Kaiser Aetna
owned land around a Hawaii lagoon completely sealed off from the Pacific
Ocean. Under Hawaii law, the lagoon was private property, unencumbered by
any public-trust servitude, on the same terms as the dry land around the
lagoon. As part of a project to develop the land around the lagoon, Kaiser
Aetna dug a channel connecting the lagoon to a nearby bay. Before it dug, it
notified the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff, who acquiesced with little
101 See Claeys, supra note 56, at 1647-48.
102 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 6, at 977 (citing Qwest v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 672
(2001)).
103 Spulber & Yoo, supra note 6, at 979.
104 See Chen, supra note 5, at 1685 & n.474 (citing FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245,
252 (1987); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1988)).
105 444 U.S. 164(1979).
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comment. After it dug, however, the Corps claimed that the channel subjected
Kaiser Aetna's lagoon to the federal navigational servitude. °6
Kaiser Aetna is especially analogous to the 1996 Act because in both
cases the owners' property claims stand in a similar gray area between pure
private property and public trust. While Kaiser Aetna's lagoon was pure private
property as long as it was not connected to the Pacific Ocean, there was always
a real possibility that it would become publici juris when connected. In
telecommunications law, the incumbents (and before them AT&T) have never
held an unqualified right to exclude. True, their franchise agreements generally
gave them the right to exclude competitors from using their local exchanges. At
the same time, the FCC did require them to connect interexchange carriers and,
more significantly, they had always owed a duty of access to customers. In both
cases, the legal ambiguities cloud the question whether the claimants have
constitutional "private property" in the right to exclude. In Kaiser Aetna, the
Court resolved this ambiguity by appealing to the idea that "'not all economic
interests are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages are 'rights'
which have the law back of them."" 07 The Corps' conduct, he concluded, led
"to the fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of
'property'-expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government must
condemn and pay for. . . ." ' It would take a thorough survey of twentienth-
century telecommunications policy to confirm the point, but it is at least
possible that incumbents can show that AT&T and they reasonably held
similar "expectancies" toward their phone lines.
Similarly, if section 251 can be viewed as establishing
telecommunications' equivalent of a right of way, section 253 can be viewed as
extinguishing telecommunications' equivalent of an intellectual-property
right.' 0 9 Again, pre-1996, incumbents (and before them, AT&T) enjoyed
franchise monopolies under state or local law to provide local phone service on
an exclusive basis. Section 253 preempted any and all local franchise laws still
in effect when the 1996 Act took effect. Section 253 thus extinguished
incumbents' right to exclude, similar to the way in which the government
extinguishes an intellectual property owner's right to sue and enjoin
infringements of her intellectual property.
The Supreme Court has rendered very few takings decisions about
intellectual property, but the leading recent case follows the same approach as
Kaiser Aetna and Loretto. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,' 0 Congress
changed federal pesticide-registration laws so as to authorize the EPA to
disclose manufacturer trade secrets it had previously been required to keep
106 See id at 166-69.
107 Id. at 178 (quoting United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945)).
108 Id. at 179.
109 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2002).
110 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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confidential. In other words, Monsanto and other pesticide manufacturers still
retained the right to use the ideas in their trade secrets, but they lost the right
to exclude others from using those ideas. The Court recognized that for trade
secrets "the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the
property interest"t t" for which just compensation was sought. Monsanto, again
like Kaiser Aetna, and like incumbents post-1996, did not lose all of its
property when the law extinguished its right to exclude. Even so, the Court
insisted:
That the data retain usefulness for Monsanto even after they are
disclosed ... is irrelevant to the determination of the economic
impact of the EPA action on Monsanto's property right. The
economic value of that property right lies in the competitive
advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of its exclusive
access to the data, and disclosure or use by others of the data would
destroy that competitive edge.' 2
That factor caused Penn Central's expectations prong to tip decisively in favor
of Monsanto for those trade secrets disclosed while the law had promised EPA
113
secrecy.
On the other hand, other regulatory-takings decisions create analogies
much more favorable to Congress and the FCC, in particular rent-control
regulations. Rent-control laws parallel section 251 's interconnection provisions
in that they relate in part to the right to exclude. A tenant may not move into
an apartment until the apartment owner has in one way or another surrendered
the right to exclude. Rent control laws also parallel section 252's rate-
regulation provisions in that they restrict the price the landlord may set for
surrendering his right to exclude.
The rent-control cases are especially revealing because they highlight the
tensions between the Libertarian and Realist renditions of Penn Central. Courts
can easily shift the focus in rent-control cases on the ground that they do not
really implicate the right to exclude. Rather, Realists argue, they merely
implicate the lesser right to alienate a present estate, and even then they merely
limit the price at which the estate may be alienated. At a high level of
generality, the Supreme Court settles rent-control cases on the basis of a factor
it calls "required acquiescence." The legal notion of required acquiescence has
its roots in another case involving the FCC-FCC v. Florida Power Corp.1
4
The law under challenge in Florida Power Corp. regulated the negotiations
between local utility companies and cable companies that wanted to buy or
111 Id. at 1011.
112 Id at 1012.
113 Id. at 1013-14. For a closer analysis of trade-secret takings cases, see Richard A. Epstein,
The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (2004).
114 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
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lease access to utility poles." 5 The law did not deserve Loretto treatment
because it concentrated only on regulating prices and because it did not impose
on the utilities any duty to provide the cable companies with access to their
poles.1 6 In the Court's explanation: "it is the invitation, not the rent, that
makes the difference. The line which separates [this case] from Loretto is the
unambiguous distinction between a. . lessee and an interloper with a
government license."'1 7 By inference, if the law in question gives an interloper
license to trespass, it triggers the concerns that informed Loretto, Kaiser Aetna,
and other cases that balance the Penn Central factors in a Libertarian spirit.
But many of the rent-control cases follow Realist tendencies much more
than cases such as Florida Power Corp. would suggest. The Supreme Court
generally does not believe that governments will disrupt owner expectations or
encourage bad social consequences if they restrain landlords' power to rent at
the prices of their choosing. Moreover, if a rent-control law deprives a
landlord of a few incidents of the right to exclude while still respecting his right
to get out of the business, the law does not raise the same concerns about
chilling effiects as Loretto. Thus, in Yee v. City of Escondido, the Supreme
Court declined to give per se Loretto treatment to a combination of rent-control
laws and a law that restrained trailer-park landlords' rights to veto tenants'
attempts to assign their leases, in part because the landlords could evict tenants
upon deciding to change the use of their land. 19
As these case analogies suggest, the key issues are not doctrinal but
substantive-the substantive issues that divide Libertarian property theory from
Realist property theory. To conclude that the incumbents deserve just
compensation, it helps to appeal to behavioral and normative claims closely
associated with the Libertarian approach, including the following: at least
presumptively, common carriers have substantially as much claim to the right
to exclude competitors as do land owners and intellectual-property owners.
This claim may follow because phone companies deserve to reap what they sow
on the same terms as other owners, because most regulated industries need to
be secure in the contours of their businesses to protect their sunk costs, or
perhaps because investments in telecommunications are especially deep and
precarious in comparison to land and the property held in other industries.
20
If this starting presumption is valid, it is not crucial that the right to
exclude plays different roles for land owners, intellectual-property owners, and
utilities. Takings law can adjust for any differences between different species of
property when it comes time to determine just compensation. Nor is it crucial
115 Id. at 247-50.
116 Id. at 251-53.
117 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 532 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting FCC v.
Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1987)).
118 See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
119 503 U.S. at 522-32.
120 See REGULATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMITMENT, supra note 86.
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to inquire whether particular state or local fianchise agreements guaranteed to
incumbents, in any clear terms, the right to exclude competitors from their
networks. The incumbents' rights and regulatory treatment, in the words of
Kaiser Aetna, could still have led "to the fruition of a number of expectancies
embodied in the concept of 'property'---expectancies that, if sufficiently
important, the Government must condemn and pay for .... 21 Of course,
these expectancies can be hard to identify, especially in an area such as
telecommunications where common-carrier obligations blur the lines between
access and exclusion. Even so, the Libertarian approach still insists that it is
worthwhile to draw such lines. The right to exclude serves as a formal proxy
for the substantive end of protecting some domain within which incumbents are
free to deploy and redeploy capital, invest in new technology, make pricing
decisions, and do all of the foregoing secure in the knowledge that they and
only they will reap the good and bad consequences of their choices. When the
law extinguishes or sharply rearranges those zones of fiedom, it disrupts a
wide web of expectations about the connection between legal rights, work, and
reward. These disruptions would be felt most directly in local telephony, and
to a lesser but still-perceptible extent in other industries in which Congress
could apply the same principles. The 1996 Act ought to be discounted, general
Libertarian principles suggest, by the extent to which those disruptions chill
the productive use and control of property in the future.
Understood in these terms, a per se compensation rule does not
compensate out of sheer formalism: the formal requirements of just
compensation have the substantive effect of discounting the 1996 Act as much
or as little as it shortchanges incumbents' stranded costs. The more that the
incumbents (and AT&T before them) have already recovered in state and local
ratemaking proceedings, the less they will deserve in just compensation.
Similarly, the higher the profits that the incumbents recover in the long-
distance industry post-1996, the less they will deserve in just compensation. A
per se or near-per se taking rule would require Congress simply to make up any
shortfall left by these two sources and the FCC's TELRIC payments. Within
Libertarian horizons, such payments would be a small price to pay to secure
investment and innovations in research-intensive industries.
On the other hand, to conclude that Congress and the FCC ought to
prevail, it helps to appeal to corresponding behavioral and normative claims
that follow from the Realist understanding of property. Within this
understanding, one presumes that the right to exclude, like any other formal
right, is not transferable from land and intellectual property to common carriers
unless specific evidence suggests otherwise. And a Realist could plausibly
conclude that there is not enough evidence to rebut this presumption in the
field of telecommunications. Land might be special because it is tangible and
121 444 U.S. at 179.
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because Americans, by long history and tradition, have built up strong
expectations about it. Intellectual property rights might be special because
patent and copyright monopolies are more time-sensitive than utility franchise
monopolies. In addition, in contrast with land and intellectual-property owners,
telecommunications companies have never had an unqualified right to exclude.
They have always owed a duty to provide access to customers. While they may
have enjoyed the right to conduct the operations of their franchises exclusively,
the broad distinctions between the exclusive and open aspects of their
businesses have always left gray areas. In particular, they have owed a duty to
interconnect competitive access providers, which the FCC imposed on the
incumbents by regulation in the 1980s. Similarly, as William Baumol and
Thomas Merrill have argued, many state and local franchise agreements did not
specifically guarantee that incumbents would enjoy exclusive control over local
exchanges. They merely provided a "permissive authorization" to build such122 ..
exchanges. And even if telecommunications companies are exposed to the
threat that governments might expropriate their capital, that risk is just a risk.
Strictly in principle, it is just as likely that telecommunications companies
have extracted rent from governments and customers as it is that the latter have
extracted rent from them.
A good Realist would also stress all the social costs that would follow if
Congress were required to pay just compensation whenever it should readjust
the rights and obligations of common carriers. Congress would never have
considered innovations as far-reaching as the pro-competitive effects of the 1996
Act. If Congress's hands were thus tied, it would have a very difficult time
responding if telecommunications carriers captured the FCC, or if economic
conditions changed in ways that required new approaches to regulation. In
principle, a Realist would argue, there is no reason to value long-term
investment goals more than short-term competitiveness goals; as an empirical
matter, he would add, there is no way to say which would have a greater
impact long-term. Indeed, the gains from opening local phone markets are more
specific and concrete than the relatively diffuse gains from encouraging
investment. Such instincts explain and lend force, for instance, to Jim Chen's
argument that per se compensation rules would "pose a serious obstacle to
structural reform of utility markets. 123
Finally, a good Realist would want to view the 1996 Act holistically, and
argue that it would exalt form over substance to say that the Act extinguished
incumbents' right to exclude competitors. Both pre- and post-1996, the
incumbents had ceded the right to exclude, and they owed duties not to
discriminate and to provide access to the local exchange at reasonable rates.
Pre-1996, the companies owed those duties to customers, while post-1996,
they owed those duties to competitors, but in either case the incumbents never
122 Baumol & Merrill, supra note 5, at 1047 & n.39 (citing Priest, supra note 17, at 303).
123 Chen, supra note 5, at 1688.
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enjoyed an unqualified right to exclude. Moreover, the 1996 Act guaranteed the
incumbents some compensation from competitors, in the form of TELRIC
rates. The Act also created new opportunities for them to profit in long-distance
markets. Given this complex redistribution, better not to insist on a rigid
approach that formalistically treats these various rights as different; better
instead to treat the whole redistribution as a legislative policy judgment. Since
the Act aimed to promote competition, the character of Congress's action
would rate high, and the Penn Central balance would tip in favor of Congress.
C. Just Compensation
The same policy questions also lurk beneath the questions relevant to just
compensation. Let us assume that the 1996 Act's local-exchange provisions do
inflict regulatory takings on the incumbents. Under any theory of the Takings
Clause the 1996 Act takes private property for public use, because it
restructures a public network while still keeping it public. 124 The next and last
doctrinal step is to determine the just level of compensation to which the
incumbents are entitled. If one subscribes to Libertarian assumptions about
property and takings, the doctrine leaves room for the incumbents to receive the
value they expected to receive in state rate proceedings, minus the money they
receive from TELRIC payments, ongoing local service, and new benefits that
the 1996 Act conferred to them. But if one subscribes to Realist assumptions,
the doctrine also leaves room to limit the incumbents' just compensation only
to the value of the rights that the Act gives them anyway-the rights to
ratemaking payments and long-distance service.
At a high level of generality, it is well accepted that owners are entitled to
lfair value for the private property taken from them, minus any compensation
that the condemning law makes in the form of money payments or in-kind
compensation. As the Supreme Court has explained, the owner who suffers a
taking should be placed "in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property
had not been taken.' 25 If one passes over exceptions not relevant here, as a
starting point the owner is entitled to receive "what a willing buyer would pay
in cash to a willilng seller."'126 If, however, the law that inflicts the taking also
provides other sources of compensation, the claimant's compensation needs to
124 This conclusion is beyond cavil under prevailing federal law, which decides public-use
issues on deferential "rational basis" grounds. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also Baumol & Merrill, supra note 48, at 1130 n.39.
But even the most suspicious public-use cases allow the government to take private property and
create a public right of access to it. See, e.g., Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768
N.E.2d 1, 9 (I11. 2002) ("Gateway's racetrack may be open to the public, but not 'by right."'). In
substance, the interconnection and franchise-repeal provisions of the Act create a public right of
access in local exchanges.
125 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
126 United States v. 546.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (citing United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943)).
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be discounted appropriately. This requirement has long been recognized in
takings case law,' 27 is supported by the Supreme Court's "reciprocity of
advantage" case law,' 28 and has been developed extensively in recent takings•• 129
scholarship about implicit in-kind compensation.
It is fairly easy to identify the factors -that drop the incumbents'
compensation to reflect offsetting reciprocal advantages. The first is a source of
explicit compensation. The TELRIC rates explicitly compensate the
incumbents for carrying the local services of the competitors.3 The second
source consists of any source of in-kind compensation provided by the Act. The
most obvious in-kind compensation consists of the new right, conferred on
incumbents by section 271 of the Act, to compete in long-distance markets. 3'
As William Baumol and Thomas Merrill argue (and as no one seriously
disagrees), incumbent carriers will receive a "valuable quid pro quo.., in the
form of access to the long-distance market."'3 2 To the extent that other
provisions of the Act compensate the incumbents..in kind along the lines of
section 271, the incumbents' just compensation should be discounted
appropriately.
.A third source to consider are incumbents' ongoing and forward-looking
profits in the local phone-service business. This downward adjustment is
needed to preserve the symmetry between the interconnectivity rules and a
hypothetical case in which Congress completely extinguishes the incumbents'
rights over local service. This symmetry is comparable to the symmetry in
land cases between total condemnations which takes the fee, and a
127 See, e.g., Paxson v. Sweet, 13 N.J.L. 196 (1832) (rejecting a takings challenge to a law
that required home owners to pave the sections of public streets in front of their homes on the ground
that the owners received just compensation in the form of better access to public facilities and their
neighbors' homes).
128 See, e.g., Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260
U.S. 22 (1922).
129 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 72, at 1225.
130 To the extent that TELRIC payments are part of the incumbents' constitutional just
compensation, courts will need to consider many procedural details of TELRIC that might not
otherwise take on constitutional significance. For example, incumbents and the FCC are now engaged
in administrative disputes about the uncollectibility problem. Incumbents want the right to refuse to
interconnect a competitor on the ground that the competitor stands a real chance of not being able to
pay its TELRIC bills after it gets access, or at least to require such a competitor to front security
deposits or advance payments as a condition before interconnecting. By contrast, the FCC has not
ruled these procedures out, but it has discouraged the incumbents from invoking them. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Verizon Petition for Emergency Declaratory and Other Relief, WC Docket No. 02-202
(Released Dec. 23, 2002), FCC 02-337, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-337AI.doc (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). The
FCC spelled out its recommended procedures in id 26. Assuming that the Act effects a taking, such
rules drive down the just compensation that incumbents get through rates set under section 252 of the
Act, and drive up any payment to which they are entitled after discounting for the rates they get and
the sources of implicit in-kind compensation discussed in this part.
131 See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
132 Baumol & Merrill, supra note 48, at 1131. J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber
generally agree with this discount in J. Gregoy Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the
Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1067, 1093-96 (1997).
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condemnation for a right of way, such as in Kaiser Aetna. When an owner
loses a right of way, she loses her right to exclude outsiders, but not her right
to possession of the right of the way. A similar symmetry applies in Monsanto
and other cases involving exclusive intellectual property.' If the government
nationalizes a trade secret and takes over the owner's monopoly, the owner is
entitled to just compensation for the fair market value of the secret. By contrast,
if the government only discloses the trade secret, it leaves the owner to compete
in the newly-competitive market. The owner's just compensation still
compensates the owner for losing its monopoly, but no longer for losing its
right to compete. In telecommunications, although the incumbents lose
franchises and exclusive control over local exchanges, they still retain
ownership of the local exchanges and the right to compete in local markets.
However, while it is easy to identify the factors that lower the appropriate
measure of just compensation, it is not as easy to put a dollar value on the
crucial rights taken. A few are easy to identify, particularly the physical-
collocation requirements of section 251(c)(6). 3 4 These provisions entitle the
incumbents to the market value of the office space taken by competitors and any
costs the incumbents must spend to help the competitors use that office space
productively. However, it is much more difficult to determine the just level of
compensation for the interconnectivity provisions of section 251 and the
franchise-preemption language of section 253.135 Common-carrier regulation
often applies to industries that are natural monopolies; it is difficult to assess
the value of businesses that have no natural competitors.
. On this point, the most relevant precedent is probably Monongahela v.
United States.'36 In that case, Pennsylvania had chartered a franchise with the
Monongahela company to build locks and dams along the Monongahela River.
Pennsylvania compensated the company with an exclusive franchise to operate
the locks and the power to set tolls in order to recoup its investments. 3 Later,
however, Congress passed a law directing the Secretary of War to take one lock
and dam. The act that provided for the taking also specified that, when the
Secretary calculated just compensation, "the fianchise of said corporation to
collect tolls shall not be considered or estimated."' 38 The federal condemnation
stands in the same relation to the 1996 Act as the Pennsylvania act of
incorporation stands to the state laws and agreements that vested franchises in
133 See Epstein, supra note 113, at 62-63.
134 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
135 47 U.S.C. § 253.
136 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
137 See id. at313-15.
138 Id at313.
Yale Journal on Regulation
AT&T and then later in incumbents. In each case, state law created a fianchise
and federal law subsequently terminated it.
39
The Court concluded that the Monongahela company was entitled to the
discounted present value of the tolls it would and could have charged under its
state franchise. Generally speaking, the Court observed that just compensation
turns on an understanding of value that "is not determined by the mere cost of
construction, but more by what the completed structure brings in the way of
earnings to its owner."4 When Congress took the lock and dam, it deprived
the Monongahela company "of the aggregate amount of such compensation
which otherwise it would continue to receive.,' 14 1 Because Pennsylvania had
guaranteed the Monongahela company the right to charge tolls as part of its
franchise, "these tolls, in the nature of the case, must enter into and largely
determine the matter of value."'42 "[Ilf the property is held and improved under
a franchise from the State, with power to take tolls," the Court insisted, "that
franchise must be paid for, because it is a substantial element in the value of the
property taken."
143
Under Monongahela and the general principles it reflects, the incumbents
are entitled to compensation comparable to the value of their franchises under
state law. State and local franchises gave incumbents power to recoup their
investments by charging regulated rates for local phone service. To measure the
economic value of those franchises, one important source of value includes the
discounted present value of those regulated rates. If state or local regulators had
posted such rates in regular schedules, in regulations or in contractual franchise
agreements, the law would discount the scheduled rates to present value.
However, as recounted in Part I, many if not most state and local utility
regulators shifted from a franchise model to ongoing and ad hoc rate-of-return
regulation during the twentieth century.J Where and when rates are set on
such an ad hoc basis, Monongahela's rule of decision requires courts to forecast
the rates that the incumbents would have recovered if the 1996 Act had not
displaced state regulation, and then discount those rates to their present value.
This conclusion also helps explain why many commentators 1 and the
Supreme Court Verizon v. FCC opinion have assumed that courts should
apply confiscatory-ratemaking principles to takings challenges to the 1996 Act.
Even if rate-of-return principles are inapposite at the takings stage, they focus on
139 See id at 341 (noting that Congress has superior power to take state franchises, "even
against the will of the State; but it can no more take the franchise which the State has given than it can
any private property belonging to an individual").
140 Id. at 328.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 329.
143 Id. at 337; see also id. at 329.
144 See Priest, supra note 17, at 301-23; KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 5-17.
145 See Chen, supra note 5; Legg, supra note 7.
146 See 535 U.S. at 523.
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considerations that are extremely relevant to the just compensation issues that
follow from a per se theory. To the extent that constitutional rate-of-return
principles have long informed and limited incumbents' local rates under state
law, those principles help forecast how much state and local franchises would
have been worth if the 1996 Act had not become law.
Under those principles, the incumbents are entitled to recover some
measure of their investment and a rate of return reasonable for an industry with a
risk profile similar to the profile for local telephony.147 Ratemaking law has
traditionally left state regulators with broad discretion to determine how much
utilities have lost in sunk costs and whether those costs are prudent. Regulators
are "not bound to the use of any single formula or combination of formulae in
,,148determining rates. Given this flexibility, Monongahela's general
prescription would probably still leave Congress and the FCC some flexibility
to adjust federal compensation to reflect the possibility that incumbents profited
in particular states more than prudent rate-of-return principles require. And
again, the just-compensation calculus would then need to deduct for what the
incumbents continue to make in the local market, the profits they make in long
distance, and the rates they recover from the TELRIC formula. But by and
large, state ratemaking and its constitutional limits set the benchmark from
which these deductions are subtracted.
This approach has come under two separate types of criticism. One
criticism holds that this approach does not compensate the incumbents enough.
Most recently, Daniel Spulber and Christopher Yoo have argued that the
incumbents are entitled to just compensation based not on constitutional-
ratemaking law but rather on the fair market value of the access rights that they
are required to surrender under the Act and TELRIC regulations. The
incumbents' just compensation for mandatory interconnection, they argue,
"depends on what the company could have obtained by selling network
services"' 49 Since "the emergence of platform competition and the shift from
rate regulation to access regulation have now made it possible to base rates on
market benchmarks,"' 50 they conclude that "ideally the purchase cost of inputs
would represent a good approximation of the earning potential-and thus the
market value-of those inputs."''
1
147 See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898) (fair value); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (prudent historical costs). For discussions of the similarities and differences
between the two standards, see EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 307-09; Chen, supra note 5, at 1679-85;
Spulber & Yoo, supra note 6, 908-12.
148 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602.
149 Spulber & Yoo, supra note 6, at 903.
150 Id. at 911; see also id. at 900-07 (canvassing several different ways to use market
mechanisms to price network rates).
151 Id at 891.
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I cannot render any definitive judgment on the economic merits of Spulber
and Yoo's proposal.' 5 2 At the same time, it is safe to say that their proposal is
not required as a matter of black-letter takings law, and that there are
understandable policy reasons why not. Ordinarily, as Spulber and Yoo
observe, just-compensation looks to the market value of the property taken.1
5 3
At the same time, as they also recognize, the doctrine looks to other measures
when the property is traded too infiequently for there to exist a market, or when
other extraordinary circumstances require a different measure.'I 4 In particular, as
the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Monongahela (on which Spulber and
Yoo rely substantially' 55), when it comes to "property devoted to a public use,
the amount of compensation [is] subject to the determination of the ... State
which authorized the creation of the property."' 156 If the state establishes tolls as
the method of compensation, "these tolls, in the nature of the case, must enter
into and largely determine the matter of value."' 57 Without making any final
judgments, this doctrinal exception is not unreasonable as a matter of policy.
When a state uses its power to grant a franchise for a bridge, rail line or phone
network, more often than not there is no meaningful market for the asset created
under the franchise. State-allowed rates are at least as accurate a source of
valuation as any other source, and they are especially useful in that they let
states control the terms on which-and particularly the exposure under which-
they create franchises and other quasi-property.
Another possible criticism of the proposal presented in this Part is that it
compensates the incumbents too much. These criticisms have been made most
forcefully in opposition to J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spulber's thesis of the
"-regulatory contract." In an article and then a subsequent book,' Sidak and
Spulber have argued that some features of pre-1996 regulation entitled
152 Their proposal would certainly make takings law easier, for it would be administratively
much easier to set just compensation by market value than by the approach prescribed in this Section.
That advantage, however, would be a one-time-only benefit, and others have warned that market-
value compensation would seriously discourage technological innovation in the long-term market for
local telephone services. See Chen, supra note 5, at 1688; Adam Candeub, Network Interconnection
and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE L. REv. 369, 426-27 (2004). Both Chen and Candeub cite and rely on
arguments propounded by Nicholas Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR, in DOWN TO
THE WIRE: STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES
140-51 (A. Shapine ed., 2003). Spulber and Yoo defend their proposal on its substantive merits in
Spulber & Yoo, supra note 6, at 895-900, and attack the standard alternatives in id. at 908-14.
153 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 6, at 952 (citing Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246
(1934); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878)).
154 See id at 953 (citing United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984); Kimball
Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949)).
155 See id. at 950.
156 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 329 (1892).
157 See id at 337 ("If that property be improved under authority of a charter granted by the
State, with a franchise to take tolls for the use of the improvement, in order to determine the just
compensation, such franchise must be taken into account .....
158 Sidak & Spulber, supra note 6.
159 J. GREGORY SIDAK, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE
COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).
Vol. 22:205, 2005
The Telecommunications Act of 1996
incumbents to recover prudent historical costs through ratemaking.'6° Now, the
proposal in this Part differs from Sidak and Spulber's argument in one
important respect: while Sidak and Spulber contend that the incumbents are
entitled to all prudent historical costs, the analysis presented here suggests that
they are entitled only to the likely discounted present value of the rates they
expected to recover in each state. If a state refused to pay for prudent historical
costs and applied some other, less-generous but still constitutional
methodology, the incumbent would be entitled to-the latter level and not the
former."' Even so, both approaches posit that the incumbents were entitled to
compensation whenever government regulators extinguished their franchises and
their control over local exchanges.
Sidak and Spulber's claim has come under serious criticism because it
seems to run contrary to the "unmistakeability" doctrine, a rule of construction
which holds that governments should be held only to contractual promises they
make in unmistakable terms."' That doctrine has led commentators to criticize
Sidak and Spulber's proposal. If states did not explicitly promise that they
would set or maintain rates at any fixed level, the argument runs, the
incumbents may not claim that they are legally entitled to any specific rate
figures in the future, whether through rate-making under the 1996 Act or in a
just-compensation proceeding. As Herbert Hovenkamp argues, "public utility
investors get from the state precisely what they are able to bargain for, no more
and no less."'163
This split between Sidak and Spulber and their critics highlights the last
tension between Realist and Libertarian approaches to takings. Both approaches
can accommodate some version of the unmistakeability doctrine, but they differ
about how aggressively to apply it. Realist theory lends itself to an aggressive
interpretation of the doctrine. It tends to construe private owners' expectations
narrowly to preserve in government broad freedom of regulatory action.
Libertarian theory, by contrast, construes the unmistakeability doctrine more
narrowly. The Supreme Court recognized as much when it insisted in
Monongahela that franchises are "a vested right," which may be retaken only
"upon the payment of just compensation."' If and when the government
extinguishes franchises, the Libertarian approach suggests, the unmistakeability
doctrine need not and should not apply. Claimants are entitled to receive the
most likely approximate value of their franchises. If state tolls or rates provide
160 See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 6, at 878-79.
161 To this extent the analysis presented herein accords with a criticism made of Sidak and
Spulber by Baumol & Merrill, supra note 5, at 1050.
162 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801, 816
(1999).
163 Hovenkamp, supra note 162, at 816-17 (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison,
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451 (1985); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168 (1947);
Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393 (1944)).
164 Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 341.
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the best available evidence of that value, then those tolls or rates are relevant,
even if the government did not promise unmistakably and unambiguously that
it would continue to provide those rates.
Thus, the just-compensation stage raises policy disagreements that are as
fundamental and pronounced as the disagreements at the takings stage. If the
incumbents have property in their franchises and freedom not to carry to the
extent that Libertarian theory prescribes, it follows that the incumbents are
entitled to recover from Congress costs left over from state ratemaking after
enforcement of the 1996 Act. Just-compensation law commits Congress to pay
incumbents the leftover value of future state rate regulation as the price to be
paid to protect and encourage long-term investment in telecommunications as
elsewhere. But if those franchises and fieedom-from-carriage expectations have
as little social value as Realist theory suggests, the incumbents should be
satisfied with the compensation they get from TELRIC and the profits from
current lines of business. Realist theory increases the burden the incumbents
need to overcome to prove that they are entitled to the discounted value of now-
terminated future state ratemaking proceedings; the theory increases that burden
because it doubts that the 1996 Act chills long-term investments as direly as
Libertarian theory assumes. The fundamental debates are the same.
IV. Conclusion
Policymakers and telecommunications scholars have tended to assume
that the law of takings is straightforward: that takings doctrine comes in one of
three simple varieties, and that one of these varieties clearly applies to the 1996
Act. In reality, however, takings doctrine reflects at a higher level of generality
many of the same theoretical and policy tensions with which policy makers
have been grappling in telecommunications. Some elements of takings theory
stress that the law ought to protect long-term interests including individual
ownership, flexibility, and the incentive effects that follow. Other elements of
takings theory suggest that such long-term interests are nebulous and hard to
measure. They prefer to narrow the scope of constitutional private property to
owners' firmest expectations. They presume that it is better not to tie
Congress's bands and frustrate concrete and immediate legislative goals. Both
elements are well enough represented in takings law to give most participants
credible takings arguments in the debate over the 1996 Act.
It is both troubling and encouraging to learn that takings law does not
resolve the 1996 Act controversy as certainly as has been suggested in the
literature to date. On the one hand, it may be troubling to know that takings
doctrine cannot impose certainty or order on the policy issues that inform
telecommunications law. On the other, it is encouraging to appreciate that the
law of takings can at least focus and sharpen the debate. If the cases and the
doctrines are understood properly, takings law can connect the most immediate
issues that arise under the 1996 Act to the most enduring questions raised by
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property-the proper relation between government action and individual
initiative.
